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MAXIMIZING THE VALUE OF PRIVACY THROUGH
JUDICIAL DISCRETION
ABSTRACT
Bankruptcy aims to provide maximum redress to creditors. In corporate
bankruptcies, legislation and regulation encourage the de-identification of
consumer information and the restriction of sales to a limited pool of qualified
purchasers operating in a similar industry. Judicial discretion is used to transfer
privity from a debtor to a qualified purchaser. Both de-identification and the
qualified purchaser requirement reduce consumer data values in bankruptcy
and provide only a thin veil of protection. With decreased consumer data values,
companies face reduced incentives to secure the data they hold, since tort law
requires a recognized harm before it can provide a remedy.
To avoid contravening the aim of bankruptcy and providing minimal
protections to consumer privacy, judicial discretion should be used to alter not
only the privity among parties but also the terms of purchase in bankruptcy. If
purchasers are required to accept a minimum value of tortious liability for
failing to secure data, then the amount they are willing to spend on data security
will increase. As the security of data increases, its market value will likely
follow. This treatment better serves the aims of bankruptcy by maximizing
redress to creditors and better serves legislative intent by fostering consumer
privacy.
INTRODUCTION
Each year, companies collect ever-increasing amounts of consumer data. As
the amount of data possessed by companies increases, the risk of harm
associated with a breach of consumer confidentiality grows in kind.1 Consumer
data is collected to provide efficient and targeted services, but companies do not
employ adequate security measures to protect the data they have collected.2

1
See Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks at Fed. Trade Comm’n
PrivacyCon 2017, 2 (Jan. 12, 2017); Nancy S. Kim, Contract’s Adaptation and the Online Bargain, 79 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1323, 1341–43, 1349–50, 1355–56 (2011) (criticizing “hook” provisions in online user agreements that
authorize the collection, retention, and commercialization of user data); FED TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING
CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 2 (Mar. 2012) [hereinafter PRIVACY REPORT].
2
See Sasha Romanosky & Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy Costs and Personal Data Protection: Economic
and Legal Perspectives, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1061, 1063 (2009) (“Personal information flows are necessary
for the functioning of modern economies and are often beneficial to consumers (data subjects), first parties (data
holders), and third party companies (data brokers). Consumers benefit from transactions involving their personal
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Increased risk of harm is heavily correlated with how many records an entity
possesses and the number of compromised records in data breaches increases
each year.3 In 2005, 32,000 private information records were revealed in the
George Mason University breach, which is minuscule compared to the massive
Yahoo breach of 1.5 billion records in 2016.4 In 2017, the Equifax data breach
demonstrated how a smaller number of records can potentiate severe harms.5
Privacy is not generally a concern of bankruptcy law, but it often becomes
one when consumer data is sold in corporate bankruptcies. Whether data is
liquidated in chapter 7 or leased and sold in chapter 11 plans, corporate filings
consolidate large stores of data, which exacerbates the threat to privacy. One of
bankruptcy’s primary aims is to maximize redress to creditors, but when that
redress involves consumer data, courts must weigh creditors’ financial interests
against consumers’ privacy concerns.6
Judicial discretion allows bankruptcy courts to balance those interests.7 In
an effort to maximize efficiency and produce equitable results, courts often
exercise discretion to authorize the sale of consumer data in bankruptcy. These
sales may contradict express company promises that collected data will not be
sold.8 Although courts claim that these distributions help repay creditors while
data due to easier access to credit and insurance, customization, and personalization.”); James P. Nehf,
Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L.REV. 1 (2003); Ramirez, supra note 1.
3
See Simson L. Garinkel, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS AND TECH., DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONAL
INFORMATION, NIST INTERNAL REPORT 8053 10-14 (October 2015), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/
NIST.IR.8053.pdf; Montjoye et al., Unique in the Shopping Mall: On the Reidentifiability of Credit Card
Metadata, 347 SCI. MAG. 536, 536–38 (2015).
4
See Lazaro Gamio & Chris Alcantara, How Data Breaches Grew to Massive Proportions in 11 Years,
WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2016, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/business/the-scale-oflarge-hacks/; Ashley Rodriguez, How Much Were Yahoo’s Massive Breaches Worth? About $350 Million and
More Future Headaches, QUARTZ (Feb. 21, 2017), https://qz.com/912055/verizon-values-yahoos-databreaches-at-350m-plus-future-headaches/.
5
Although the information is not conclusive at the time of writing, current estimates intimate that 143
million people may have been affected by the data breach. This means that up to sixty percent of Americans
over the age of 18 may have had very sensitive compromised. Seena Gressin, The Equifax Data Breach: What
to Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N: CONSUMER INFO. BLOG (Sep. 8, 2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/
2017/09/equifax-data-breach-what-do; QuickFacts Table, U.S. Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045216. (last visited Jan. 12, 2018).
6
1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.01[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
7
11 U.S.C. § 105 (2012) (“The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title”).
8
See Letter from David Vladeck, Director, Fed. Trade Comm’n Bureau of Consumer Prot. to Michael
Baxter and Yaron Dori (September 14, 2011) [hereinafter Vladeck Letter to Baxter], available at
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/09/ftc-seeks-protection-personal-customer-informationborders; Statement of Commissioner Sheila F. Anthony, Toysmart.com, No. X00-0075, No. 00-13995 (CJK)
(D. Mass. Jul. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Anthony Statement], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
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protecting consumer privacy, data is usually sold for nominal amounts and
consumer privacy protections are routinely outdated.9 As the amount of data
collected increases, the concern for consumer privacy must likewise increase, or
the law will fail to both repay creditors and protect consumers.10
The 2015 RadioShack bankruptcy presents a good example of the way the
law currently addresses consumer privacy issues in bankruptcy.11 RadioShack
sold its intellectual property assets, including its trademarks and the personally
identifiable information (PII) of 117 million customers.12 The question of
whether RadioShack could sell customer PII became a point of contention for
numerous parties, including RadioShack customers, multiple state attorneys
general, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Apple, Verizon Wireless
(Verizon), and AT&T.13 On RadioShack’s petition date, its privacy policy
cases/toysmartanthonystatement.htm. But see Statement of Commissioner Mozelle W. Thompson,
Toysmart.com, No. X00-0075, No. 00-13995 (CJK) (D. Mass. Jul. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Thompson statement]
(arguing that the proposed sale of consumer data was not inconsistent with Toysmart’s privacy policy),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/toysamrtthompsonstatement.htm.
9
In light of the bankruptcy law’s stated aims, the rise in consumer data breaches and the minimal
valuation of data asset distributions provide evidence of inadequate legal treatment. Conservative estimates
suggest 25 major data breaches from businesses in 2005. Those totals rose by an average of 141.23 percent each
year until 2016, despite government efforts to deter and prevent data breaches. Compare Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 232 §§ 231–34, 110 Stat. 23
(addressing the perceived threats to privacy from the collection and distribution of consumer information, and
trying to prevent harm from occurring), and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102 §§ 501–27, 113
Stat. 1338 (1999) (addressing how banks collect, store, and distribute information to prevent harm), and Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191 § 221, 110 Stat. 1936
(providing safeguards for medical information) with IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER, ITRC BREACH
STATISTICS 2005–2016 (2017), http://www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/2016/Overview2005to2016
Finalv2.pdf (showing data breaches and the harm to consumer privacy despite attempts at prevention). See, e.g.,
supra note 8; Letter from Jessica Rich, Director, Fed. Trade Comm’n Bureau of Consumer Prot. to Elise Frejka
(May 16, 2015) [hereinafter Rich Letter], available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_
statements/643291/150518radioshackletter.pdf.
10
There is a common and growing need to review, address, and manage the collection of consumer
privacy. See, e.g., Ramirez, supra note 1 (“Experts estimate that, by the year 2020, there will be a 4,300 percent
annual growth in the amount of data that is collected”). As is common with many goods-turned-commodities,
there will be those who harvest, refine, or trade in a desired commodity. See, e.g., ACXIOM, 2016 ANNUAL
REPORT 13 (2016), http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ACXM/3857056437x0x897585/1A5C33C7-9C804621-8B3E-15F7D2C86D5B/ACXM_Annual_Report_FINAL_RRD_Printers_Proof_6-17-16_.pdf (“We offer
multi-sourced insight into approximately 700 million consumers.”).
11
See Rich Letter, supra note 9. On the RadioShack bankruptcy, see generally Alan Wolf, RadioShack:
A Brief History of Time, TWICE (Feb. 16, 2015), http://www.twice.com/news/retail/radioshack-brief-historytime/56040.
12
Marshall J. Hogan, Customer Data Sale in Bankruptcy: Lessons from RadioShack, LAW360 (July 15,
2015, 2:03 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/679550/customer-data-sale-in-bankruptcy-lessonsfrom-radioshack.
13
Cara Salvatore, RadioShack Gets OK for Data Sale Deal with Verizon, AT&T, LAW360 (Jun. 9, 2015,
7:46 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/665356/radioshack-gets-ok-for-data-sale-deal-with-verizonat-t; Certification of Counsel Regarding Interim Order Approving Interim Stipulation for Implementation of
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defined PII and explained how it would be handled.14 The policy included an
express promise that RadioShack “will not sell or rent [consumer] personally
identifiable information to anyone at any time.”15 Reinforcing this promise, the
policy also proclaimed, “We pride ourselves on not selling our private mailing
list.”16 In light of these promises, it seems intuitive that the court would prevent
the sale of the PII, yet the ultimate approval of the sale shows otherwise.
Here, state attorneys general, attempting to mitigate potential privacy harms,
objected to the sale of PII.17 One of their concerns was how many data points,
or pieces of information, these records contained.18 In RadioShack’s settlement,
it agreed to reduce the twenty-one-point data set of customer information to
seven, removing such information as phone numbers and limiting which e-mail
addresses were sold.19 Although the settlement was deemed a success,
enhancements in modern technology enable re-identification and targeting based
on fewer data points.20 Therefore, the reduction from twenty-one to seven points
did little to deter future breaches.
Protocols with Verizon and AT&T in Connection with the Transfer of Customer Data to General Wireless, In
re Radioshack, No. 15-10197 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. 2015), https://consumermediallc.files.wordpress.
com/2015/06/m042115274439.pdf; John Ribeiro, 25 U.S. states oppose sale of RadioShack’s customer data,
PCWORLD (Mar. 26, 2015, 5:40 AM).
14
Rich Letter, supra note 9.
15
“Personally identifiable information may include information that you provide to us by requesting
information, when registering for special offers or programs or when you buy products online. This may include
your name, address (including billing and shipping addresses), telephone number, e-mail address, organization,
city, state and zip code. We may use this information to process and ship orders, to contact you about the status
of your order, to contact you with answers to your questions, or to provide information about new and exciting
products, services, promotions and corporate-related information. We may use mailings, telephone calls and email to contact you . . . . We will not sell or rent your personally identifiable information to anyone at any time.”
Id. at 2 (quoting RadioShack’s then-current privacy policy). Since at least 2004, the privacy policy had
specifically claimed that “[RadioShack would] not sell or rent [customers’] personally identifiable information
to anyone at any time.” Id. at 2, n.5.
16
See id. at 3 (citing RadioShack’s privacy policy from 2014).
17
Ribiero, supra note 13.
18
State of Texas’s Limited Objection to Sale of Personally Identifiable Information of One Hundred
Seventeen Million Consumers, In re RadioShack Corp., 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 4541 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015),
https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/1393.pdf.
19
Among the concessions, RadioShack limited the e-mail addresses sold to those active within two years
of petition. Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. State Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces
Agreement to Protect Consumer Data in RadioShack Bankruptcy (May 20, 2015), https://ag.ny.gov/pressrelease/ag-schneiderman-announces-agreement-protect-consumer-data-radioshack-bankruptcy.
20
Although it was not stated as a primary factor, it seemed one concern was that of consumers being
contacted without consent. The FTC readily admits that modern technology makes it difficult to circumvent
these concerns. Bikram Bandy, Your Top 5 Questions about Unwanted Calls and the National Do Not Call
Registry, FED. TRADE COMM’N: CONSUMER INFO. BLOG (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/
your-top-5-questions-about-unwanted-calls-and-national-do-not-call-registry (“Current technology makes it
easy for scammers to fake or ‘spoof’ caller ID information, so the number you reported in your complaint
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Further, RadioShack collected consumer information pursuant to its privacy
policy when it sold products and services, including those provided by Verizon,
Apple, and AT&T.21 When RadioShack filed for bankruptcy and offered to sell
customer information, all three companies objected to the sale of customer
information involving their products or services.22 Verizon and AT&T’s
objections were granted, while customers who purchased Apple products
through RadioShack saw their information sold.23 This disparate treatment
raised two questions: What discretionary powers do bankruptcy courts have to
change, ignore, or enforce privacy policy terms? What factors does the law
consider when deciding how to handle these sales?
The court followed the FTC’s recommendations to impose four
requirements: first, that PII not be sold as a stand-alone asset; second, that the
buyer be a qualified purchaser engaged in the same line of business as the seller;
third, that the buyer agree to honor privacy policy terms; and fourth, that the
privacy policy terms would be altered only with the express consent of
customers.24 These standards are not unique to In re RadioShack, and, in each
circumstance, they are aimed at protecting consumer privacy while maximizing
repayment to creditors. Yet, here and elsewhere, they might accomplish neither.
While some have advocated addressing the issue legislatively,25 this
Comment argues that, to protect consumer data while providing redress to
creditors, bankruptcy courts should expand the use of judicial discretion in both
chapter 7 and chapter 11 corporate bankruptcy proceedings to consider the future
value of consumer data when altering contract terms. This expanded use of
discretion should establish clear liability values for consumer data breaches,
expand the scope of what constitutes a qualified purchaser, and order the
destruction of all data not sold before the conclusion of the proceedings.
Company incentives to secure data involve an analysis that weighs the cost
of securing the data against the costs that would result from a data breach.
Bankruptcy courts should perform three market manipulations to increase

probably isn’t real. Without more information, it’s difficult for us to identify the actual caller. Nonetheless, the
FTC analyzes complaint data to identify illegal callers based on calling patterns. The agency also is pursuing a
variety of technology-based solutions to combat illegal calls and practices.”).
21
Salvatore, supra note 13; Certification of Counsel, supra note 13; Ribiero, supra note 13.
22
Salvatore, supra note 13.
23
Certification of Counsel, supra note 13; Salvatore, supra note 13.
24
Buyer had to agree to be bound by the privacy policy terms that governed the PII when it was acquired.
Rich Letter, supra note 9, at 5.
25
See Kayla Siam, Coming to a Retailer Near You: Consumer Privacy Protection in Retail Bankruptcies,
33 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 487 (2017).

TAN_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS

686

6/14/2018 3:47 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

security for consumer data. First, increasing the costs incurred by data breaches
would increase the incentive to secure data, which in turn would strengthen
consumer data values. Second, expanding the number of qualified purchasers
would foster competition among buyers. Third, destroying unsold data would
preclude later purchases by those unwilling to protect it and would decrease the
available supply. These market manipulations of the supply-demand curve
would increase the value of data and thus result in greater redress to creditors.
At the same time, an increased incentive to secure consumer data would likely
produce beneficial externalities, such as increased consumer awareness of
privacy concerns.
This Comment will begin by demonstrating how the organic development of
the law has failed to keep pace with rapid technological advancements.
Throughout the discussion, this Comment will establish how the law balances
consumer privacy concerns with economic interests in legislation, regulation,
and jurisprudence. The Comment will then discuss the extent to which
bankruptcy courts can alter contract terms through judicial discretion. Finally,
the Comment will conclude by offering a solution to protect privacy while
increasing redress to creditors by changing how bankruptcy courts use judicial
discretion.
I.

PRIVACY OUTPACED BY TECHNOLOGY

The legal system generally treats privacy less as an entitlement to be
positively asserted than as a right whose violation opens the door to redress. In
fact, privacy originated as a value to be preserved through negative rights that
developed organically throughout history.26 Over time, ex ante prohibitions were
introduced to guard citizens from unconstitutional invasions by the government,
while ex post remedies compensated victims of privacy harms.27 Even today,
there is no standard treatment of privacy rights despite the growing need.28
26
See, e.g., William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960); RUTH MACKAY, THE BAKER
WHO PRETENDED TO BE KING OF PORTUGAL (2012) (in feudal times, Gabriel de Espinosa was sentenced to death
for impersonating the late King Sebastian of Portugal); Ross A. Thompson, Vulnerability in Research: A
Developmental Perspective on Research Risk, 1991 ANNUAL PROGRESS IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND CHILD DEV.
119, 135 (Stella Chess & Margaret E. Hertzig eds., 1991) (positing that privacy is a step in self-identity and
“[p]rivacy interests and concerns increase and become more differentiated as children mature, and broaden from
an initial focus on physical and possessional privacy to include concerns with informational privacy”).
27
See Nehf, supra note 2, at 30–31, 33–34.
28
FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK 2–3 (Feb. 2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-book-january-december2015/160229csn-2015databook.pdf (the FTC discusses the prolific threat of identity theft, and notes that over
three million complaints of appropriation were lodged from 2013 to 2015). Compare 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)
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A. Early Scholarship and Cases
Privacy can be viewed as a positive right to be protected or as a negative
right enforced through a legal remedy.29 Early scholarship included Warren and
Brandeis’s The Right to Privacy and William Prosser’s Privacy, which illustrate
the divergent perspectives.30 Warren and Brandeis argued that privacy should be
a right to be enjoyed,31 while Prosser saw the issue as embodying four torts that
offer remedies for privacy violations.32 The distinction turns on whether the aim
is to prevent harm or to provide redress.33
Privacy as a positive right involves the option of requesting government
intervention and enforcement before a harm occurs.34 Member states of the
European Union provide the option of enforcing this positive right on
unnecessary use of personal data,35 while citizens retain negative rights to
(2012) (“The bankruptcy court, for cause, may protect an individual, with respects to the following types of
information to the extent the court finds that disclosure of such information would create undue risk of identity
theft or other unlawful injury . . .”); and 11 U.S.C. § 332 (2012); and 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012); and 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028(d)(7) (2012); and FED. R. BANKR. P. 9037; and Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
(BAPCPA) Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 231–34, 110 Stat. 23 (in each of the aforementioned laws,
consumer privacy protections are intended to be protected ex-ante, to prevent appropriation) with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652A(2) (1979) (“The right of privacy is invaded by (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the
seclusion of another, as stated in § 652B; or (b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness, as stated in § 652C;
or (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life, as stated in § 652D; or (d) publicity that
unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public, as stated in § 652E.”).
29
See Nehf, supra note 2, at 5–6; Prosser, supra note 26; Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 486–
88 (1968); DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES 7–9 (1989).
30
Compare Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205–
06, 213–20 (1890), with William L. Prosser, supra note 26.
31
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 30, at 211 (“[N]ow that modern devices afford abundant opportunities
for the perpetration of such wrongs without any participation by the injured party, the protection granted by the
law must be placed upon a broader foundation.”).
32
Prosser, supra note 26 (establishing four torts for the invasion of privacy: “[i]ntrusion upon the
plaintiff’s . . . solitude, . . . public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff . . . publicity which
places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye[, and] [a]ppropriation . . . of the plaintiff’s name or likeness”).
33
The different vantage points, and their corresponding effects on what is instituted, are most clearly
illustrated by criminal law and the difference between utilitarian and retributive theories of justice. Namely, the
difference lies in that the former seeks to deter future harm, while the latter seeks to punish. Both aim to address
crime, albeit through distinctly different methods. See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Retribution’s Role, 84 IND. L.J.
1129, 1131–33 (2009); Gerard V. Bradley, Retribution: The Central Aim of Punishment, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 19, 30 (2003) (“[R]etribution attempts to restore social balance instead of seeking only to discourage
similar criminal behavior.”).
34
The right to be forgotten, as asserted in Europe, is illustrative of this. See Press Release No 70/14, Court
of Justice of the European Union, Judgment in Case C-131/12 (May 13, 2014), available at
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-05/cp140070en.pdf (“[T]he Court holds that a fair
balance should be sought in particular between that interest and the data subject’s fundamental rights, in
particular the right to privacy and the right to protection of personal data.”).
35
EUR. COMM’N, Factsheet on the “Right to be Forgotten” Ruling (2014), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/
data-protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf.
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remedies.36 These comprehensive laws are a relatively new replacement to what
had been a patchwork of legal treatments.37
United States privacy law still operates on an organically developed
framework founded on negative rights.38 Privacy violations are generally
remedied through tort actions and, in limited circumstances, the law grants
positive rights, such as the protection against search and seizure.39 Advancing
technology inspired legal developments through litigation as opposed to
legislation.40
While technology spurred early privacy law, jurists’ responses to
technological changes lagged behind technological developments. Courts
initially did not find protections for intrusions of privacy analogous to those that
existed for physical intrusions, nor did they foresee how privacy threats would
continue to mount. Brandeis, however, excelled where his peers failed, and his
fear that “what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the housetops” preceded decades of legal developments.41
In Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme Court faced the question of
whether the warrantless wiretapping of a citizen’s home violated the Fourth
Amendment.42 The majority held that there was no violation of constitutional
protections because there was no seizure of physical effects nor physical
invasion of the home.43 Brandeis presciently dissented in Olmstead: “But ‘time
works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.’ Subtler and
36
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 1, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679; Directive 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by
competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA.., 2016 O.J. (L 119) 89, 1, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016L0680.
37
See Regulation (EU) 2016/679, supra note 36, at 89.
38
From wiretapping in Katz to digital collection of children’s information, privacy has developed as a
response to stimulus. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 357–59 (1967); Fed. Press Release,
Federal Trade Commission, FTC Announces Settlement With Bankrupt Website, Toysmart.com, Regarding
Alleged Privacy Policy Violations (July 21, 2000) [hereinafter Toysmart Press Release], https://www.ftc.
gov/news-events/press-releases/2000/07/ftc-announces-settlement-bankrupt-website-toysmartcom-regarding.
39
For an overview of privacy law, see generally Nehf, supra note 2, at 29–58.
40
See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 357–59; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456–57, 464–66
(1928); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Toysmart, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21963, at *1 (D. Mass. 2000).
41
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 30, at 195.
42
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455.
43
Id. at 466.

TAN_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS

2018]

MAXIMIZING THE VALUE OF PRIVACY

6/14/2018 3:47 PM

689

more far-reaching means of invading privacy have now become available to the
government.”44 Here, he saw what others did not: technology was outpacing the
law.
After nearly four decades of failing to recognize non-physical invasions, the
Court held in Griswold v. Connecticut that “the First Amendment has a
penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion,” which
affirmed the right to privacy.45 Two years later, in Katz v. United States, the
Court removed physical intrusion as a requirement for an invasion of privacy.46
History reflects the law’s sluggish progression when compared to the alacrity
with which technology advances. For example, in the forty years that the law
had taken to recognize, in Katz, that wiretapping falls within the Fourth
Amendment, televisions had become widespread and video recording equipment
had become available for home use.47 This disparate rate of the development of
law and technology persists into the digital age of “[s]ubtler and more farreaching means of invading privacy.”48 While Brandeis wrestled with
wiretapping a private home, today, our information is tracked on a scale
previously unimagined.49 The digital age introduced a host of legal issues such
as the distribution of consumer data as a bankruptcy asset.
B. FTC v. Toysmart
FTC v. Toysmart is the seminal case addressing consumer privacy policies
and consumer data sold in bankruptcy.50 Prior to its bankruptcy filing in 2000,
44

Id. at 473.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
46
See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466; Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 359 (wiretapping criminal acts in a public phone
booth qualified as a search and seizure).
47
See Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438; Katz, 389 U.S. 347; COBBETT STEINBERG, TV FACTS (1980) (prevalence
of television sets in American households).
48
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473. Comparing legal development and technology shows the disparity of pace.
See, e.g., Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455, 466 (physical intrusion was required for illegal search and seizure, yet
wiretapping already existed); Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 359 (wiretapping was finally considered an invasion, but
TV broadcasts were now common and home video technology had been released); Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191 § 221, 110 Stat. 1936 (addressing the need to
store private health information, but falling behind the widespread use of the internet); Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102 §§ 501–27, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (conceiving notice and consent, but seemingly
ignorant of the widespread use of the internet and growing cellular market); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 232, 110 Stat. 23; Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
Toysmart, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21963 (D. Mass. Aug. 21, 2000) (responding to the collection and distribution
of consumer data from online customer accounts, without acknowledging the widespread collection of metadata
and the ease of re-identification).
49
Mark Mulcahy, Big Data Statistics & Facts for 2017, WATERFORD TECHNOLOGIES (Feb. 22, 2017),
https://www.waterfordtechnologies.com/big-data-interesting-facts/.
50
See Rich Letter, supra note 9; Vladeck Letter, supra note 8.
45
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Toysmart.com advertised, promoted, and sold toys to adults and children.51 The
collected names, addresses, and shopping history of Toysmart customers were
offered for sale in bankruptcy, contrary to the terms of the company’s privacy
policy.52 Through their combined efforts, the FTC and the bankruptcy court
confronted the unauthorized collection of children’s data and resolved the issue
of the sale of customer data contrary to the Toysmart.com privacy policy.53
Toysmart.com customers purchased goods under privacy policy terms that
dictated “[p]ersonal information voluntarily submitted by visitors to our site,
such as name, address, billing information and shopping preferences, is never
shared with a third party.”54 Therefore, allowing the sale of this consumer
information would seem to contravene the contractual obligations arising under
the privacy policy.55 FTC Commissioners Anthony and Thompson believed,
however, that restricting how and to whom the information could be sold would
address consumer privacy interests, maximize repayment to creditors, and
provide a satisfactory compromise between those concerns.56 Consumer privacy
interests would be protected through data anonymization and creditors would be
served by the sale of the data. Therefore, this perspective supported a looser
interpretation of contract terms.
FTC Commissioner Swindle conceded that the proposed compromise was
better than allowing a completely unrestricted sale of the information, but he
ultimately dissented on grounds that the bankruptcy order should enforce the
company’s promise never to sell customer information to a third party.57 In a
footnote, he added that he would have supported the majority position if

51

Toysmart Press Release, supra note 38.
Id.
53
Id.; see also Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (providing
protection to children surfing the internet); Toysmart.com Privacy Policy, TOYSMART.COM, http:www.ftc.gov/
os/2000/07/toyexh1.pdf (“Personal information voluntarily submitted by visitors to our site, such as name,
address, billing information and shopping preferences, is never shared with a third party.”).
54
Toysmart Press Release, supra note 38; Toysmart.com Privacy Policy, supra note 53.
55
Toysmart Press Release, supra note 38; Toysmart Privacy Policy, supra note 53; see also U.C.C. § 2206 (amended 2002) (offer and acceptance in formation of contracts requires offer and acceptance); Stipulation
and Order Establishing Conditions on Sale of Customer Information, No. 00-13995 (CJK) (D. Mass. Jul. 20,
2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/toysmartconsent.htm (ruling that Toysmart
violated 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012) “by disclosing, selling or offering for sale personal customer information,
contrary to the terms of its privacy policy that personal information would never be disclosed to third parties”).
56
See Anthony Statement, supra note 8; Thompson Statement, supra note 8.
57
Statement of Commissioner Orson Swindle, Toysmart.com, No. X00-0075, No. 00-13995 (CJK) (D.
Mass. Jul. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Swindle Statement] (“Toysmart promised its customers that their personal
information would never be sold to a third party, but the Bankruptcy Order in fact would allow a sale to a third
party. In my view, such a sale should not be permitted because ‘never’ really means never.”).
52
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customers had been given adequate notice and willingly consented to the terms
presented in the bankruptcy order.58 The FTC’s decision thereby prioritized
creditors’ economic redress above consumers’ privacy.59 This set a precedent
that allowed bankruptcy courts to alter privacy agreements in two ways: (1)
privacy policies could still allow the transfer of consumer data to a third party,
if it was done through estate distribution in bankruptcy, and (2) courts could now
alter privacy contracts to bind parties to new terms or to new parties.
II. CURRENT LEGAL SOLUTIONS TO PRIVACY PROBLEMS
Congressional and regulatory oversight of consumer privacy began a few
years after Griswold and Katz were decided in 1965 and 1967.60 Laws such as
the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA), the Privacy Act of 1974, the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), and the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) each focus
on different sectors of information.61 Although the FTC has been delegated the
authority to protect consumers and their privacy, these acts represent further
legislative guidance. Here, Congress defined personal information differently
for each sector, which in turn limits what the FTC can consider sensitive
information that it is charged to protect.62
A.

Privacy Laws

In 1970, Congress delegated authority to protect consumer privacy to the
FTC through the FCRA.63 This act was the first federal law regulating the use of
58
Id. at n.1 (“If Toysmart had obtained the consent of its customers to a sale of the customer lists to a
buyer that met the specific conditions spelled out in the Bankruptcy Order, I would have had no objection to the
sale.”).
59
Toysmart Press Release, supra note 38.
60
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (recognizing that “Constitutional guarantees,”
including the Fifth Amendment, create a “zone of privacy” encompassing married couples’ use of
contraceptives); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 359 (1967) (holding that the Fifth Amendment protects
against searches that invade reasonable expectations of privacy).
61
The laws listed are not exhaustive but do provide an illustrative sample of legislative treatment. See,
e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012);
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936;
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6505 (2012); Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 231–34, 110 Stat. 23.
62
The FTC recognizes a consensus that data—such as that collected from children, financial transactions,
health information, and social security numbers—comprises sensitive information, which should require notice
of terms by the company and consent from the customer. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 1, at 58–59.
63
The FTC regulates consumer reporting agencies and limits the use of information collected, such as
credit history and payment patterns, as well as demographic and identifying information. See Fair Credit
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personal information by private businesses and it sought to promote the
accuracy, fairness, and privacy of consumer information in the growing credit
reporting industry.64 By collecting large amounts of private data, credit reporting
agencies became a powerful force in expanding credit availability and promoting
economic efficiency.65 However, to ensure accuracy and prevent abuse, the FTC
required that consumers be notified and give consent before information is
collected.66 Although the act was pivotal in considering both consumer privacy
and economic efficiency, it covered only a small sphere of consumer privacy.
Subsequent legislation aimed to expand protection in other sectors of business
while simultaneously promoting economic efficiency. In a rare instance of legal
foresight, Congress safeguarded against deficiencies in future legislation by
granting the FTC the authority to devise regulatory stop-gap measures.
The increasing rate at which government agencies were collecting,
maintaining, and disseminating personal records prompted the Privacy Act of
1974.67 Congress barred the communication of personal information to any
person or agency without the express consent of the person involved, although
exceptions were carved out for the operation of the government.68 The Act was
updated in an attempt to keep up with advancing technology, such as the 1988
and 1990 updates to address the growth of computer usage.69 Having
demonstrated its intent to safeguard privacy against government intrusion,
Congress turned its attention to other areas of priority during the 1990s.
Congress passed HIPAA to combat abuse of Protected Health Information
(PHI).70 In 1995, an estimated 84.6 percent of the U.S. population was reportedly
covered by some form of health insurance, which helped meet the demands of

Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681; FED. TRADE COMM’N, 40 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE WITH THE FAIR
CREDIT REPORTING ACT, AN FTC STAFF REPORT WITH SUMMARY OF INTERPRETATIONS 1 (July 2011),
[hereinafter FTC STAFF REPORT], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/40-yearsexperience-fair-credit-reporting-act-ftc-staff-report-summary-interpretations/110720fcrareport.pdf.
64
See Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
65
See MARK FURLETTI, FED. RESERVE BANK OF PHILA., An Overview and History of Credit Reporting
4–6 (Jun. 2002), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/consumer-credit-and-payments/payment-cards-center/
publications/discussion-papers/2002/CreditReportingHistory_062002.pdf; Rowena Olegario, Credit-Reporting
Agencies: Their Historical Roots, Current Status, and Role in Market Development 8–9 (World Bank, Working
Paper No. 27825, 2001), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/477365-1257315064764/
2429_olegario.pdf.
66
FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 63, at 2.
67
See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012).
68
Id.
69
Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388.
70
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936.
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the aging baby boomers.71 As the number of participants in healthcare increased,
so did the attempts to take advantage of them.72 In response, the law’s heavy
regulatory scheme seemingly prioritized consumer privacy concerns over
economic efficiency.73 This trade-off may have been shortsighted, however,
considering that National Healthcare Expenditure (NHE) accounted for 12.7
percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1995, reaching $957.8 billion.74 It
then grew to approximately $3.3 trillion, accounting for 17.9 percent of U.S.
GDP in 2016.75
HIPAA protects consumer privacy by placing strictures on how companies
can store and transfer consumer data.76 Since customers can trust that the transfer
of data from one company to another will follow these more secure protocols,
consumers may be less fearful about changing providers of insurance or
healthcare, which bolsters market competition. Furthermore, HIPAA assigns
both positive and negative rights to PHI.77 It sets security standards to protect
PHI as a positive right, and it enforces the negative right by punishing misuse,
abuse, or lack of security.78 Healthcare fraud and abuse cost an estimated $100
billion in 1995 and rose to $260 billion in 2012.79 Here, the fact that 84.6 percent
71
Population Profile of the United States 4, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (1997), https://www.census.gov/
prod/3/98pubs/p23-194.pdf.
72
Health Care Fraud Report, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1–2 (Oct. 27, 1997),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/us-department-justice-health-care-fraud-report.
73
Meredith Kapushion, Hungry Hungry HIPAA: When Privacy Regulations Go Too Far, 31 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1483, 1502 (“HIPAA’s high costs, questionable benefits, and numerous economic, legal, and
administrative consequences make a strong case for repeal.”).
74
Cathy A. Cowan & Bradley R. Braden, Business Households and Government: Healthcare Spending,
1995, 18 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 195, 196 (1997); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS, NATIONAL
HEALTH EXPENDITURES 2015, HIGHLIGHTS, https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/
statistics-trends-and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/downloads/highlights.pdf; United States GDP Data from
the World Economic Outlook Database, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Oct. 2016), http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=25&pr.y=9&sy=2015&ey=2020&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=cou
ntry&ds=.&br=1&c=111&s=NGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC&grp=0&a=#download.
75
Cowan, supra note 74; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS, supra note 74; United States GDP
Data, supra note 74.
76
45 C.F.R. § 164.530 (2012).
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
COMM. ON GOV’T. REFORM AND OVERSIGHT, HEALTH CARE FRAUD: ALL PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
PAYERS NEED FEDERAL CRIMINAL ANTI-FRAUD PROTECTIONS, H. R. REP. NO. 104-747 (1996) (“Health care
fraud [is], by some estimates, a $100 billion problem.”), https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/104thcongress/house-report/747/1; Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Louisiana,
Medicare Fraud Strike Force Charges 107 Individuals for Approximately $452 Million in False Billing (May 2,
2012) (“The United States spends more than $2.5 trillion on health care annually and rough estimates indicate
that anywhere from 3 to 10 percent of all health care expenditures are attributed to fraud”),
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/neworleans/press-releases/2012/medicare-fraud-strike-force-charges-107individuals-for-approximately-452-million-in-false-billing.
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of the U.S. population faced privacy threats, and nearly 12.7 percent of domestic
GDP faced hundreds of billions in financial harm, add substantial support to the
notion that pecuniary interests were at play in congressional intent.
In 1998, Congress passed COPPA to protect the privacy of children younger
than 13.80 Children faced increased marketing attention at home and in schools.81
Congress was concerned about online advertising in the 1990s because the
interactivity of the medium posed a new threat.82 To mitigate the risk of harm,
COPPA requires parental consent, establishes privacy policy standards, and site
operation guidelines.83 The FTC addresses any statutory gaps.84 After market
adoption in 2002, 90 percent of websites provided notice, but only
approximately half properly handled the information collected.85
Here, congressional intent focused on protecting children’s privacy and
placed a lower priority on economic considerations than on parental control.86
However, the act applies only to websites that direct their operations at children
or websites that possess actual knowledge that the information collected belongs
to children.87 These measures are mostly ineffective since websites can either
target children without collecting personal information or collect information
from users who do not self-identify as children.88 Although Congress intended

80

Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2012).
Channel One gave schools free audiovisual equipment and services, which allowed it to advertise to
millions of children for two minutes a day. See Drew Tiene, Channel One: Good or Bad News for Our Schools?,
50 CHANGING CURRICULUM 46, (May 1993). Billions of dollars were spent in the 1990s on marketing to
children. JAMES MCNEAL, THE KIDS MARKET: MYTH AND REALITIES, 14–15 (1999).
82
See Angela J. Campbell, Ads2Kids.com: Should Government Regulate Advertising to Children on the
World Wide Web?, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 311, 325–27 (1997–1998) (discussing the myriad methods that advertisers
used to target children at the time).
83
15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2012).
84
Id. § 6505.
85
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CHILDREN’S PRIVACY UNDER COPPA: A SURVEY ON COMPLIANCE
15 (Apr. 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/rules/children%E2%80%99s-online-privacyprotection-rule-coppa/coppasurvey.pdf.
86
15 U.S.C. § 6502 (2012).
87
Lauren A. Matecki, Update: COPPA is Ineffective Legislation! Next Steps for Protecting Youth Privacy
Rights in the Social Networking Era, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y. 369, 387 (2010) (“These screening methods are
technologically ineffective, as computer-savvy children often know how to circumvent these attempted
roadblocks. The ease of age falsification leads to a situation where children may share personal information on
a website that seeks to operate outside of COPPA restrictions because it—officially—doesn’t allow underage
users.”).
88
15 U.S.C. §§ 6501, 6502(b)(1)(A) (“ . . . require the operator of any website or online service directed
to children that collects personal information from children or the operator of a website or online service that
has actual knowledge that it is collecting personal information from a child.”).
81
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to protect children’s privacy, the law contains large gaps that FTC regulations
have yet to address.89
In 1999, the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act (or “GLBA”)90 repealed restrictions
of the Glass-Steagall Act,91 thus permitting insurance and bank holding
companies to merge and enabling the formation of Citigroup.92 The GLBA’s
preamble states its purpose is “[t]o enhance the competition in the financial
services industry by providing a prudential framework for the affiliation of
banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and other financial services
providers, and for other purposes,” which clearly shows that economic interests
governed legislative intent.93 In addition to promoting the economy, however,
the GLBA’s anticipation of potential privacy harms, stemming from the creation
of the first “universal” bank in America, created compliance standards for
financial privacy, safeguards, and pretexting protections.94 These privacy rules
operate under notice and consent frameworks.95
Although Congress put some safeguards in place for consumer privacy,
those protections failed to recognize the increased threat posed by a single entity
holding so much data.96 The Citigroup merger consolidated the insurance and
financial records of millions of customers, which increased the risk of harm
posed by a data breach. Economic concerns were certainly paramount, but the
notice and consent provisions in the act demonstrate that Congress did not
completely ignore consumer privacy concerns, even if it failed to properly
protect them.
89

See generally Matecki, supra note 87.
15 U.S.C. §§ 6801−09 (2012); Federal Reserve History, Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999,
commonly called Gram-Leach-Bliley (Nov. 12, 1999) (“This legislation, signed into law by President Bill
Clinton in November 1999, repealed large parts of the Glass-Steagall Act, which had separated commercial and
investment banking since 1933. This led to the creation of financial holding companies, over which the Fed was
granted new supervisory powers”), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/gramm_leach_bliley_act.
91
Act of Feb. 27, 1932, ch. 58, Pub. L. No. 72–44, 47 Stat. 56; Act of June 15, 1933, 6573–66. GlassSteagall Act, ch. 88, Pub. L. No. 73-65, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (providing for the safer and more effective use of
bank assets).
92
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801−09 (2012) (enhancing competition in the financial services).
93
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
94
See 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b) (2012) (financial privacy rule and safeguards rule); 15 U.S.C. §§ 6821(a)–(b)
(2012) (pretexting protection). Merging Citicorp and Travelers resulted in a banking, securities, and insurance
service. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Citigroup: A Case Study in Managerial and Regulatory Failures, 47 IND.
L. REV. 69, 70–71 (2014) (“[S]upporters of the merger hailed Citigroup as the first modern American ‘universal
bank’ . . . . “).
95
See 15 U.S.C. § 6802 (2012).
96
E.g., Tom Zeller, Jr., Personal Data for 3.9 Million Lost in Transit, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 7, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/07/business/personal-data-for-39-million-lost-in-transit.html (the United
Parcel Service had lost in transit a box of computer tapes containing information on 3.9 million customers for
the consumer finance subsidiary of Citigroup) (hereinafter Zeller).
90
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Despite the intent to promote economic efficiency, the FCRA, the Privacy
Act of 1974, and HIPAA all managed to address consumer privacy interests,
perhaps due to each Act’s particular subject matter. Both the Privacy Act of 1974
and HIPAA specifically addressed consumer information, while the FCRA and
GLBA addressed economic efficiency. The FCRA promoted economic
efficiency by regulating credit reporting, while the GLBA promoted economic
efficiency by allowing the consolidation of businesses and peripherally
addressing data.97
BAPCPA amended the Code to address privacy concerns and system
abuse.98 The act added the presumption of abuse,99 mandated two years between
filings,100 and required credit counseling to qualify for protection.101 Privacy
protections within BAPCPA addressed the treatment of PII102 and created a
consumer privacy ombudsman.103
Provisions in BAPCPA mirror the FTC and bankruptcy court’s prerequisites
to selling consumer data laid out in Toysmart.104 The court in Toysmart, which
stated that “in the absence of overruling federal law, [the decision] is to be
determined by reference to state law,”105 seemingly should have honored state

97
Privacy Act of 1974, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (July 17, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opcl/privacy-act-1974 (The act specifically references information gathered by federal
agencies, the term “consumer” here is referencing the citizens who information is collected); Summary of the
HIPAA Security Rule, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2018)
(describing how HIPAA protects health information about actual persons); Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),
Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-84/pdf/STATUTE-84-Pg11142.pdf (every instance of information gathering specifically addresses the growing need for standardized data
collection and distribution for the changing infrastructure of 1970); Fed. Trade Comm’n, Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act (Sep. 4, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/privacy-and-security/gramm-leach-blileyact (“The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires financial institutions—companies that offer consumers financial
products or services like loans, financial or investment advice, or insurance—to explain their informationsharing practices to their customers and to safeguard sensitive data”).
98
See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 1098, § 232, 119 Stat. 72.
99
11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2012).
100
Id. § 727.
101
Id. § 109(h).
102
Id. § 363 (b)(1).
103
Id. § 332.
104
Both Toysmart and BAPCPA allow for the transfer of consumer data contrary to prior obligations, with
restrictions on alienation. Compare F.T.C. v. Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00-CV-11341-RGS, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21963 (D. Mass. Aug. 21, 2000), with Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 232, 119 Stat. 72.
105
Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161 (1946); cf. Swindle Statement,
supra note 57.
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contract law. Instead, the court held that debtors could sell consumer information
under limitations similar to those later set forth in BAPCPA.106 One of the
limitations in both BAPCPA and Toysmart is the requirement that assets that
contain personally or directly identifiable information—such as names,
addresses, telephone numbers, or account numbers—be sold only to a qualified
purchaser.107
The trial court in Toysmart required a qualified purchaser to (1) be in a
related market, (2) continue to operate in the related market, and (3) agree to
abide by the Toysmart.com privacy policy, unless customers gave affirmative
consent before any material changes were made.108 These requirements predated
and inspired § 363(b)(1), which mirrors Toysmart by stating that PII can be sold
only if the sale or lease is consistent with governing privacy policy terms, or if
an appointed consumer privacy ombudsman approves the sale after notice and a
hearing.109 The consumer privacy ombudsman decides whether to approve the
sale after considering the cost to consumer privacy, much as the FTC did in
Toysmart.
BAPCPA clearly mirrors Toysmart in that consumer data can be sold only
pursuant to governing privacy policies or if the consumer privacy ombudsman
approves the sale after considering how it might affect consumer privacy.
Congress relies on the FTC’s regulatory authority to protect consumer privacy
against threats from gaps in statutory protections.110 Just as the FTC advised the
court in Toysmart, BAPCPA intended the consumer privacy ombudsman to
serve a similar advisory role.111 Although BAPCPA contains measures to protect
consumer privacy, technology has outpaced those protections.
B.

Balancing Creditor Interests and Privacy

Bankruptcy courts and the FTC possess broad discretion over the sale of
personal customer data in corporate bankruptcy filings,112 both must consider

106
See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 1098, § 232, 119 Stat. 72.
107
Id.
108
F.T.C. v. Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00-CV-11341-RGS, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21963.
109
11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2012); see 11 U.S.C. § 332 (2012).
110
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2012).
111
11 U.S.C. § 332 (2012) (“The consumer privacy ombudsman may appear and be heard at such hearing
and shall provide to the court information to assist the court in its consideration of the facts, circumstances, and
conditions of the proposed sale or lease of personally identifiable information under section 363(b)(1)(B)”).
112
See, e.g., In re Tweeter Home Ent. Grp., No. 07-10787 (PJW), 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3418, (Bankr. D.
Del. Oct. 2, 2007); Letter from David Vladeck, Dir., Fed. Trade Comm’n Bureau of Consumer Prot. to Peter
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the circumstances of the sale, consumers’ privacy interests, and the financial
interests of creditors.113 Toysmart, the seminal case in these matters, gave
priority to creditor interests over consumer privacy concerns and allowed for the
sale of information.114 Bankruptcy courts and the FTC have since decided other
cases by altering or ignoring contract terms, with varied methods and results.
In 2007, In re Tweeter displayed how a bankruptcy court’s discretion can
extend privacy policies beyond express limitations.115 Tweeter Home
Entertainment Group’s online privacy policy specifically excluded retail and
phone operations by stating that it covered “personal information collected via
this Web site, and not through any other activities of Tweeter or its affiliates or
business partners.”116 Since the proposed sale of all customer data collected
would operate contrary to the privacy policy, 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) required that
a consumer privacy ombudsman be appointed to determine whether to allow the
sale. The ombudsman and the FTC ignored the stated exclusions and
recommended that Tweeter’s policy extend to all three sales channels. The court
agreed with these recommendations and sold all of Tweeter’s PII. Thus, its
decision outright altered contract terms to provide redress to creditors.117
In 2010, XY.com and XY Magazine filed for bankruptcy, and to prevent
potential harm to customers, they were not allowed to sell PII.118 During the
case, concerns were raised about how customer information would be handled.
Under § 363(b)(1), an ombudsman was appointed because the privacy policy
would be violated by the proposed sale.119 There, the FTC argued that customers
had consented to have their information used only to operate XY.com and XY

Larson et al. (July 1, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/100712xy.pdf) [hereinafter Vladeck Letter to
Larson]; cf. In re Borders Grp., 453 B.R. 459 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
113
11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
114
Although the sale was allowed, it was not without objection. Commissioner Swindle said, “Toysmart
promised its customers that their personal information would never be sold to a third party, but the Bankruptcy
Order in fact would allow a sale to a third party. In my view, such a sale should not be permitted because ‘never’
really means never.” See Swindle Statement, supra note 57.
115
See In re Tweeter Home Ent. Grp., No. 07-10787 (PJW), 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3418 (Bankr. D. Del.
Oct. 2, 2007).
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Vladeck Letter to Larson, supra note 112.
119
CONSENT ORDER DIRECTING THE APPOINTMENT OF A CONSUMER PRIVACY OMBUDSMAN PURSUANT
TO 11 U.S.C. § 332, Case No. 10-1443 (MBK), Doc. 77-1 (July 23, 2010), https://www.eff.org/files/consent_
order_ombudsman.pdf; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 332, 363 (2012) (Section 332 explains the duties of an ombudsman,
while § 363 delineates the appointment of an ombudsman).
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Magazine. The purchaser countered that the sale should be allowed since he
planned to restart both companies. 120
In response, the FTC argued that “[d]ue to the nature of the information, the
passage of time, and the closure of the magazine and website in 2007 and 2009,
respectively, the continued use of the data may pose privacy risks not reasonably
contemplated by subscribers . . . .”121 The purchaser could not provide sufficient
guarantees that information would be used with the same limitations as in XY’s
prior operations. In this case, the court placed greater value on consumer privacy
concerns, since XY’s customers could potentially face harm due to the sale of
their data. As a result, unlike in Toysmart and Tweeter, consumer privacy
concerns were given priority over creditor interests, and the court ordered the
destruction of all of the PII.122
In 2011, the Borders bookstore chain was not allowed to sell its customers’
personal information unless it honored its promise not to do so without their
consent.123 Borders’ privacy policy, in 2006 and 2007, promised that it would
disclose information to third parties only if the customer expressly consented to
such disclosure.124 Borders amended its policy on May 27, 2008, however, to
allow the sale of consumer data in bankruptcy without express consent:
Circumstances may arise where for strategic or other business reasons,
Borders decides to sell, purchase, merge or otherwise reorganize its
own or other businesses. Such a transaction may involve the disclosure
of personal or other information to prospective or actual purchasers, or
receiving it from sellers. It is Borders’ practice to seek appropriate
protection for information in these types of transactions. In the event
that Borders or all of its assets are acquired in such a transaction,
customer information would be one of the transferred assets.125

The FTC commissioner refused to accept the amended language
chapter 7 dissolutions and concluded that it should apply only to
operations, such as a merger or chapter 11 restructuring.126 Since
chapter 7 filing, the privacy policy terms barred the sale, and
120
121
122
123

applied to
continuing
this was a
11 U.S.C.

11 U.S.C. §§ 332, 363 (2012)
Id.
Id.
In re Borders Grp., No. 11-10614 (MG), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4606 (U.S. Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27,

2011).
124

Vladeck Letter to Baxter, supra note 8.
See id.
126
See id. (“We view this provision as applying to business transactions that would allow Borders to
continue operating as a going concern and not to the dissolution of the company and piecemeal sale of assets in
bankruptcy.”).
125
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§ 363(b)(1) again required the appointment of a consumer privacy ombudsman.
The ombudsman and the FTC recommended that Borders seek express consent
from customers before selling PII, and the court agreed. Customers who did not
consent to the sale would have their PII purged.127
The FTC recognized that “bankruptcy may present special
circumstances,”128 and recommended the sale be allowed under BAPCPA
conditions.129 The bankruptcy court believed that Borders should be allowed to
“marshal remaining assets for its creditors” by selling consumer information.130
Barnes and Noble (B&N) was allowed to buy Borders’ IP assets for $13.9
million so long as it conformed to the express consent policy.131 This amount
may seem significant, but B&N paid only about $0.35 for each consumer record
purchased.132
In 2014, ConnectEDU’s bankruptcy filing differentiated how PII would be
sold in chapter 7 and chapter 11.133 Unlike prior cases, where courts altered
privacy policy terms to allow the sale of PII, here § 363(b)(1)(A) was strictly
enforced, and ConnectEDU was not allowed to sell PII unless it complied with
its privacy policy.134 The FTC recommended that the court appoint a consumer

127
Although it was not expressly defined in the letter from the FTC, the common usage of the word
“purge,” in this context, implied that the data would be destroyed similarly as in prior cases. See Vladeck Letter
to Larson, supra note 112; see also F.T.C. v. Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00-CV-11341-RGS, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21963 (D. Mass. Aug. 21, 2000) (ordering the destruction of information collected from children).
128
The FTC was referencing the unique circumstances of bankruptcy, where a company seeks either to
reorganize or to liquidate assets to repay creditors. See Vladeck Letter to Baxter, supra note 8.
129
The FTC would allow the sale if: (1) Borders agreed not to sell the customer information as a standalone
asset; (2) buyer was engaged in substantially the same lines of business; (3) buyer expressly agreed to be bound
by and adhere to the terms of Borders’ privacy policy; and (4) buyer received affirmative consent from
consumers for any changes to the privacy policy. Vladeck Letter to Baxter, supra note 8; see Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 232, 119 Stat. 231 (codifying the
Toysmart standards).
130
Vladeck Letter to Baxter, supra note 8, at 4.
131
Mark S. Melodia & Paul J. Jaskot, Barnes & Noble’s Acquisition of Borders’ Database on the Shelf?,
TECHNOLOGY L. DISPATCH (Sept. 23 2011), https://www.technologylawdispatch.com/2011/09/intellectualproperty/barnes-nobles-acquisition-of-borders-database-on-the-shelf/ (as evidenced by the $13.9 million dollar
price tag B&N agreed to pay for the IP assets).
132
See Jeff Roberts, Did B&N Pull a Fast One with Borders’ Customer List?, GIGAOM (Oct. 5, 2011,
11:48 AM), https://gigaom.com/2011/10/05/419-did-bn-pull-a-fast-one-with-borders-customer-list/ (“[i]n order
to clinch its purchase of 40 million customer names from bankrupt Borders, Barnes & Noble made a series of
promises to the court on steps it would take to protect the privacy of those customers.”).
133
In re ConnectEDU, Inc., No. 14-11238 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2014); Rich Letter, supra note 9.
134
Rich Letter, supra note 9. The Commissioner incorrectly cited 11 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(A), which does
not exist, instead of 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)(A).
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privacy ombudsman to ensure the protection of consumer privacy interests.135
The court ordered ConnectEDU to provide users with proper notice and the
opportunity to remove PII; otherwise the users’ data would be destroyed.
Ultimately, the court prevented the sale of PII because such sale would violate
contract terms, and § 363(b)(1)(B)(ii) requires a “finding that no showing was
made that such sale or such lease would violate applicable nonbankruptcy
law.”136
C. Technology, Data, and the Growing Threat
The law and data security have been outpaced not only by technology but
also by the growing threat to privacy. Targeted services and information
collection are not new to the digital age, but modern technology has certainly
helped expand them.137 Whereas efficient mailing systems facilitated direct
marketing in the 1960’s, today’s age of big data allows for staggering breaches
of email systems. One example of this would be in the Yahoo data breach of
2016, where 500 million individuals’ records were exposed.138 As the collection
and use of consumer information continued to grow exponentially, the threat to
consumer privacy soared, even prior to today’s age of big data.139
In 1984, a single Sears, Roebuck & Company store failed to secure its
password, which enabled hackers to steal 90 million credit histories from their

135
However, current authority held by the ombudsman and common court treatment of these cases are
insufficient to protect those privacy interests. Rich Letter, supra note 9; see 11 U.S.C. § 332 (2012) (if the sale
goes against the privacy policy under a 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)(A) review, then 11 U.S.C. § 332 requires the
appointment of a consumer privacy ombudsman when the sale operates under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)(B)).
136
11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)(A) (2012).
137
See Nehf, supra note 2 (“Direct marketing to individuals was an inefficient and comparatively costly
business practice for most of the twentieth century . . . . Cyberspace technologies and the widespread use of the
Internet profoundly affected the data collection business by the late 1990s.”).
138
See id. (“Sorting data by zip codes proved to be a rough but inexpensive way to reach certain
demographic subgroups.”); Gamio & Alcantara, supra note 4; see also Hayley Tsukayama, et al., Yahoo Data
Breach Casts ‘Cloud’ over Verizon Deal, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-switch/wp/2016/09/22/report-yahoo-to-confirm-data-breach-affecting-hundreds-of-millions-ofaccounts/?utm_term=.28f2ef786a8f (comparing 32,000 records stolen in 2005 with the massive theft of 500
million records in 2016); Ernie Hayden, Data Breach Protection Requires New Barriers, TECHTARGET (May
2013), http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Data-breach-protection-requires-new-barriers.barriers.
139
Identity Theft: Is There Another You?: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms., Trade &
Consumer Prot. and the Subcomm. on Fin. & Hazardous Materials of the Comm. on Commerce H.R., 106th
Cong. (1999). Although the entire report speaks to identity theft, a statement of note is made in discussing 15
U.S.C. § 1601: “[R]eports that consumer inquiries to the Trans Union credit bureau’s Fraud Victim Assistance
Department increased from 35,235 in 1992 to 522,922 in 1997, and that the Social Security Administration’s
Office of the Inspector General conducted 1,153 social security number misuse investigations in 1997, compared
with 305 in 1996.”.
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archives, computers, or filing systems.140 Although this was a massive data
breach, it stemmed from the confluence of efforts by hackers and negligence by
an employee.141 On November 2, 1988, the Morris Worm was released. It
crippled approximately ten percent of the 88,000 computers that were on the
internet at the time and caused about $15 million in damage.142 Note that the
former was caused by user negligence and the latter was the result of a single
person’s creation.
In the 2000s, the GLBA143 allowed for the formation of Citigroup, whose
2005 data breach was one in a series of examples that demonstrated the danger
of increased data consolidation. Today’s threat to privacy is the result of multiple
factors coming together: the constant introduction of new technology; increased
consumer adoption of technology and information systems; consumer trust in
companies; and the lack of security against data breaches.
From 2005 to 2016, data breaches rose multiplicatively every few years, and
the trend is unlikely to reverse without intervention.

140
See Stuart Diamond, Credit File Password is Stolen, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 1984), http://www.
nytimes.com/1984/06/22/business/credit-file-password-is-stolen.html; Julianne Pepitone, 5 of the Biggest-Ever
Credit Card Hacks, CNNTECH (Jan. 12. 2014, 7:11 PM), http://money.cnn.com/gallery/technology/security/
2013/12/19/biggest-credit-card-hacks/index.html.
141
See Diamond, supra note 140; Pepitone, supra note 140.
142
See Michelle Delio, The Greatest Hacks of All Time, WIRED (Feb. 6. 2001), https://www.wired.com/
2001/02/the-greatest-hacks-of-all-time/.
143
15 U.S.C. §§ 6801−6809 (2012).
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Major Data Breaches (2005-2016)
Entity
People Affected
144
Citigroup
3.9 Million
TJX Companies Inc.145
94 Million
Heartland Payment Systems146 130 Million
Sony PlayStation Network147
101 Million
148
Target
70 Million
eBay149
145 Million
US Voter Data150
191 Million
Adult FriendFinder151
412 Million
Yahoo152
1 Billion

As the chart above demonstrates, the increasing size and frequency of data
breaches poses a problem for corporations. Although hardware is developing at
a decreased pace, consumers are generating data at rapidly accelerating rates.153
This is no anomaly. It simply shows that, as more consumers adopt new
technologies or use information systems, the number of people generating data
records increases in kind.154 This trend contributed to an average increase in data
generation by a factor of ten every two years since 1986155 In 2013, 90 percent
144

See Zeller, supra note 96.
Pepitone, supra note 140.
146
Technically, the breach occurred over the course of multiple years, culminating in 2009. Andy
Greenberg, The Year of the Mega Data Breach, FORBES (Nov. 24, 2009, 7:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
2009/11/24/security-hackers-data-technology-cio-network-breaches.html#2d79ae04d038.
147
See Nate Lord, The History of Data Breaches, DIGITAL GUARDIAN, https://digitalguardian.com/blog/
history-data-breaches (last visited Jan. 27, 2017) (combining Sony’s 2010 data breach of 77 million records with
2011’s 24.6 million, for a total of 101 million).
148
Id.
149
Jim Finkle, Hackers Raid eBay in Historic Breach, Access 145 Million Records, REUTERS (May 21,
2014, 11:01 PM), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ebay-password/hackers-raid-ebay-in-historic-breach-access145-million-records-idUKKBN0E10ZL20140522.
150
Jim Finkle & Dustin Volz, Database of 191 Million U.S. Voters Exposed on Internet, REUTERS (Dec.
28, 2015, 7:22 PM), https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-usa-voters-breach/database-of-191-million-u-s-votersexposed-on-internet-researcher-idUKKBN0UB1E020151229.
151
Andrea Peterson, Adult FriendFinder Hit with One of the Biggest Data Breaches Ever, Report Says,
WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/11/14/adultfriendfinder-hit-with-one-of-the-biggest-data-breaches-ever-report-says/?utm_term=.121d3da61b4a.
152
Vindu Goel & Nicole Perlroth, Yahoo Says 1 Billion User Accounts were Hacked, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/technology/yahoo-hack.html.
153
PETER HARSHA, IT Research and Development Funding, in CHASING MOORE’S LAW: INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 22 (William Aspray ed., 2004); Åse Dragland, Big Data – for
Better or Worse, SINTEF (May 22, 2013), https://www.sintef.no/en/latest-news/big-data-for-better-or-worse/.
154
Id.
155
Lucas Mearian, Scientists calculate total data stores to date: 295+ exabytes, COMPUTERWORLD
(Feb. 14, 2011), https://www.computerworld.com/article/2513110/data-center/scientists-calculate-total-data145
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of all data worldwide was shown to have been generated within the previous two
years.156 By December 31, 2016, Facebook’s 1.86 billion monthly active users
shared 216,302 videos per minute on Messenger.157 Currently, Google processes
40,000 search queries every second, or 1.2 trillion searches per year.158 As new
users adopt technology, data generation increases at a disproportionately high
rate, which produces alarming amounts of collected data.
Companies’ success in properly harnessing the data they collect correlates
with improved corporate performance. Some reports, in fact, suggest that a 10
percent increase in data accessibility can result in $65 million of additional net
income for a typical Fortune 1000 company.159 FTC reports predict that by 2020,
there will be 50 billion internet-connected devices and that 90 percent of cars
will have an internet connection.160 The extensive and growing nature of data
makes it essential for the law to keep pace. If the law fails to protect against
technological threats today, as it did in Olmstead, the consequences will be
drastic and may expose the intimate details of millions of individuals’ lives.
D. Insufficient Means to an End
BAPCPA161 and FTC regulatory goals may seek to protect consumer
privacy, but the provisions, as drafted, provide insufficient protections for
multiple reasons. First, bankruptcy courts may be applying state substantive law
that should be trumped by federal law. Second, the scope of personally

stored-to-date--295--exabytes.html (humankind has stored 295 exabytes of data since 1986); Dragland, supra
note 153; The Digital Universe of Opportunities: Rich Data and the Increasing Value of the Internet of Things,
EMC, https://www.emc.com/leadership/digital-universe/2014iview/executive-summary.htm (last visited Mar.
18, 2018).
156
Dragland, supra note 153; accord Google Search Statistics, INTERNET LIVE STATS,
http://www.internetlivestats.com/google-search-statistics/#ref-2 (last visited Feb. 19, 2017, 6:25 PM).
157
Data Never Sleeps 4.0, DOMO, https://www.domo.com/learn/data-never-sleeps-4-0 (last visited
February 19, 2017).
158
Google Search Statistics, supra note 156.
159
Trips Reddy, Creating a Future-Ready Company in 2017, IBM WATSON (Dec. 21, 2016),
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/watson/2016/12/creating-future-ready-company-2017-business-leaders-know/
(suggesting that a mere 10 percent increase in data accessibility will result in more than $65 million additional
net income for a typical Fortune 1000 company). Cf. Ranjay Gulati, Inside Best Buy’s Customer-Centric
Strategy, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 12, 2010), https://hbr.org/2010/04/inside-best-buys-customer-cent
160
Internet of Things, FED. TRADE COMMISSION STAFF REP. i, 1 (Jan. 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitledinternet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf.
161
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8,
§ 232, 119 Stat. 23; see Protecting Consumer Privacy, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/media-resources/protecting-consumer-privacy232 (the FTC has been the chief federal agency on privacy
policy and enforcement since the 1970s).
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identifiable information is too narrow. Last, qualified purchaser requirements
contravene their intended purposes by limiting creditors’ economic redress and
increasing the likelihood that information will be re-identified.
1. Federal Discretion and Contracts
The sale of consumer data is customarily governed by bankruptcy courts
who weigh the aims of bankruptcy against privacy concerns.162 State law
normally governs without federal override. BAPCPA, however, not only
demonstrates the intent of Congress to allow bankruptcy courts to alter contract
terms in privacy policies, but also grants them explicit authority to do so.163
Some might argue that this authority contravenes contract law, but there are
several reasons this is not the case.
The law has traditionally frowned upon restraints on the power of alienation,
such as in the conveyance of property.164 Companies offer goods to consumers
in exchange for payment of the listed price and the collection of consumer data,
and when customers buy from the company, they demonstrate acceptance of
those terms.165 When those privacy policies promise never to sell or lease the
data, it is a restraint on alienation and thus a suspect contract term.166
However, consumer data is not identical to physical property. Turning
instead to intellectual property law, importing concepts such as the first sale
doctrine can provide analogies that further justify this override. In Cuozzo Speed
Techs., LLC v. Lee, the Supreme Court analogized overturning a conviction
based on the insufficiency of an indictment to disallowing inter partes review
based on the “reasonable likelihood” of a party prevailing.167 First sale doctrine
states that once a copy of a copyrighted work is purchased from the copyright
162
Cf. In re Tweeter Home Ent. Grp., No. 07-10787 (PJW), 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3418 (Bankr. D. Del.
Oct. 2, 2007); see, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub.
L. No. 109-8, § 232, 119 Stat. 23; In re Borders Grp., No. 11-10614 (MG), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4606 (U.S.
Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2011); In re RS Legacy Corp., No. 15-10197 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 5, 2015);
163
See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 1098, § 232, 119 Stat. 23.
164
Although it does not strictly refer to information, the concepts of selling, leasing, or conveying
consumer data are easy to analogize with property. Cf. Andrews v. Hall, 58 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Neb. 1953) (“It
is the general rule that a grant or devise of real estate to a designated person in fee simple, with provisions therein
that are inconsistent or repugnant thereto such as a restriction against the power to sell, mortgage, or otherwise
encumber, conveys an absolute fee and such restrictions are void.”).
165
Cf. U.C.C. §§ 2-204, 2-205, 2-206, 2-207 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (if a privacy
policy is viewed as an additional term governing the collection of data, in addition to the offer and acceptance
of the company’s good or service).
166
See, e.g., Andrews, 58 N.W.2d at 202–03.
167
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2153 n.7 (2016).
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holder, the copyright holder cannot prevent the copy from being resold.168 Here,
just as the sale of a copyrighted work implicitly leads to the surrender of some
rights, so may the sale of private consumer data allow privity to transfer from
seller to purchaser in bankruptcies.169
Since BAPCPA expressly discusses the de-identification, transfer, and sale
of consumer information sold in bankruptcy, similar reasoning can justify
overriding state contract law.170 Discretion has been given to bankruptcy courts
to maximize a debtor’s estate to repay creditors while protecting the privacy of
consumers. The question, then, is whether that discretion is being properly
employed to meet those goals.
2. De-identification and Lack of Security
Mirroring the law’s failure to relinquish physical intrusion as a requirement
for the invasion of privacy until Katz, the code’s definition of PII is trapped in
times past.171 The Code’s definition of PII is limited to a physical address and
corresponding telephone number or a physical person’s name, e-mail address,
and social security number.172
(A) if provided by an individual to the debtor in connection with
obtaining a product or a service from the debtor primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes—
(i) the first name (or initial) and last name of such individual,
whether given at birth or time of adoption, or resulting from a
lawful change of name;
(ii) the geographical address of a physical place of residence of
such individual;
(iii) an electronic address (including an e-mail address) of such
individual;
(iv) a telephone number dedicated to contacting such individual
at such physical place of residence;
168

17 U.S.C. § 109 (2012).
See Kirtsaeng v. Wiley, 568 U.S. 519, 526, 529 (2013) (addressing the question of transfer of rights of
alienability in the purchase, sale, and resale of copyrighted works, as well as whether contract terms or first sale
doctrine would apply if in contradiction with one another).
170
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8,
§§ 231–32, 119 Stat. 23.
171
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465–66 (1928) (holding that wiretapping conversations
within someone’s home was not an invasion of privacy, nor a violation of 4th or 5th Amendment protections);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (recognizing nonphysical invasions of privacy).
172
11 U.S.C. § 101(41)(A) (2012). Note that this portion only applies if it is in connection with one of the
above. As such, if someone has all of your data except for the things listed in § 101(41)(A), then it is not PII.
That is why this Comment discusses how easy it is to identify someone without that data.
169
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(v) a social security account number issued to such individual;
or
(vi) the account number of a credit card issued to such
individual; or
(B) if identified in connection with 1 or more of the items of
information specified in subparagraph (A)—
(i) a birth date, the number of a certificate of birth or adoption,
or a place of birth; or
(ii) any other information concerning an identified individual
that, if disclosed, will result in contacting or identifying such
individual physically or electronically.173

This definition mainly addresses means of communicating with another person,
but doesn’t even begin to address the intimate details that can be gained by more
modern data collection.174 Consider that the code does not even peripherally
address telephone metadata, such as text messages, numbers dialed, location
tracking, or how long a conversation is held. Furthermore, the code covers only
those telephone numbers that are “dedicated to contacting such individual at
such physical place of residence.”175 This narrow scope arguably fails to include
nearly half of United States households, as studies indicate that 49.3 percent of
households use only wireless telephones.176
Furthermore, any argument that names, social security numbers, and e-mail
addresses are protected by the current language neglects to consider that it might
be entirely unnecessary to directly collect that information in the digital age.
Metadata177 labeled as “Customer Proprietary Network Information” is collected
by telecommunications companies and “is densely interconnected, easily reidentifiable, and trivially gives rise to location, relationship, and sensitive
inferences.”178 While PII may allow third parties to contact, locate, or potentially
173

Id.
Id.
175
Id.
176
Stephen J. Blumberg & Julian V. Luke, Wireless Substitution: Early Release of Estimates from the
National Health Interview Survey, January–June 2016, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH SCI. (Dec. 2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/wireless201612.pdf. To clarify the statistics, 49 percent of
households are wireless-only, while 3.1 percent have no phone whatsoever, which would indicate that 52.4
percent of households don’t have land lines. For the author’s purposes, however, the only interesting number is
the percentage of wireless-only households.
177
Metadata is generally defined as data that describes other data. This can take various forms including:
image metadata regarding a picture’s size, color profile, resolution, creation date, alteration date, software used
to create it; web page metadata describing the keywords for search engines and scripts running; or text document
data that describes the author, creation date, document size, and software used to create it.
178
Jonathan Mayer et al., Evaluating the Privacy Properties of Telephone Metadata, 113 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.pnas.org/content/113/20/5536.full.
174
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defraud consumers, metadata can predict personal details.179 One study was able
to uncover private information, such as a subject’s health conditions or even to
infer whether someone owned an ArmaLite (AR) rifle, using only telephone
metadata and linking data points to publicly available information, such as listed
telephone numbers.180 Current law provides customers with moderate
protections from telemarketing, mass mailings, and e-mail spam, but does little
to protect against identity theft or other invasions of privacy, such as revealing
personal details through metadata.
One issue unaddressed by BAPCPA’s requirement to de-identify PII is
robocallers.181 Robocallers auto-dial phone numbers using Voice Over Internet
Protocol (VOIP) services to deliver pre-recorded messages.182 Upon contacting
a potential target, the system determines whether an individual is a desirable
target before placing an operator on the phone.183 The FTC reports that the
agency has undertaken more than 100 enforcement actions against 600
companies and individuals responsible for billions of illegal calls.184 Since
robocallers auto-dial phone numbers until they reach a potential target, deidentifying PII is ineffective against this threat.185 Recognizing this, the FTC has
instituted more creative measures, such as crowdsourcing186 security
development to civic hackers.187
The fundamental flaw of de-identifying PII is that it attempts to minimize
harm while retaining monetary value. Paul Ohm eloquently summarized the
problem by stating, “[d]ata can be either useful or perfectly anonymous but
never both.”188 Ohm proposed that de-identification comes at a greater cost to
179

Id.
Id.
181
How Does A Robocall Work?, FED. TRADE COMM’N https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/pictures/0381-robocalls-infographic.png (last visited Feb. 3, 2017); Robocalls, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/features/feature-0025-robocalls (last visited 2/3/2017).
182
How Does A Robocall Work? supra note 181.
183
Id.
184
Robocalls, supra note 181.
185
How Does A Robocall Work?, supra note 181.
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Crowdsourcing. MERIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (2018), https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/crowdsourcing (“the practice of obtaining needed services, ideas, or content by soliciting
contributions from a large group of people and especially from the online community rather than from traditional
employees or suppliers”).
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DetectaRobo, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/contests/detectarobo (last
visited Feb. 3, 2017) (“As part of the National Day of Civic Hacking on June 6, 2015, the FTC challenged the
tech-savvy public to DetectaRobo. Contestants analyzed call data to create algorithms that could predict which
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UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1704 (2010).
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secure privacy, since re-identification continuously becomes easier and less
expensive.189
Bankruptcy may provide a thin veil of protection for consumer privacy
through de-identification, but these measures are easily pierced by linkage
attacks.190 Linkage attacks compare records in de-identified data sets with
separate but related records to uniquely identify targets.191 With a greater
number of data points, the success of these attacks can reach near-certainty.192
An early study used U.S. Census data to uniquely identify 61 to 87 percent of
the United States population with only three data points: five-digit ZIP Code,
gender, and date of birth.193 The same study uniquely identified 18 percent of
the U.S. population using only county, gender, and date of birth.194 When the
study combined gender and date of birth with city, town, or municipality in the
linkage attack, 53 percent of the U.S. population could be uniquely identified.195
The difference between the last two is explained by the fact that more people
share a county of residence in common than a specific city, town, or
municipality.196 This demonstrates the inverse relationship between the number
of people who share a data point and re-identification. In other words, as the
number of people who share a data point increases, the utility of that data point
for re-identification decreases.
Even seemingly innocuous information can re-identify an individual, given
the presence of sufficient data points. In 2006, Netflix released de-identified
records of 500,000 subscribers for a contest to suggest improvements for the
Netflix movie recommendation service.197 The data set was sparse and contained
only movie ratings and dates, which Netflix believed made the information
incapable of being re-identified.198 Researchers uniquely identified 99 percent

189
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Garinkel, supra note 3; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 107(c), 332, 363(b) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7) (2012);
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9037; see also Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(BAPCPA), PL 109-8, §§ 231–32, 119 Stat. 23, 72–73.
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Garinkel, supra note 3
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Id.; Montjoye et al., supra note 3.
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Latanya Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely 2 (Carnegie Mellon Univ.,
Data Privacy Working Paper, 2000), http://dataprivacylab.org/projects/identifiability/paper1.pdf.
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Katie Hafner, And If You Like the Movie, a Netflix Contest May Reward You Handsomely, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 2, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/02/technology/02netflix.html.
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Arvin Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-Anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets, IEEE
SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY 8 (2008), http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_oak08netflix.pdf?
utm_source=datafloq&utm_medium=ref&utm_campaign=datafloq.
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of records that contained eight movie ratings and the dates they were
reviewed.199
Alarmingly, the results remained accurate even if two of the reviews were
falsified and the dates provided fell within a 14-day margin of error.200 Using
only two movie ratings and dates with a three-day margin of error allowed for
68 percent unique identification.201 The research cross-referenced public IMDB
ratings to bolster its records and further demonstrated that even something as
trivial as movie preferences can reveal other, more personal details.202 The
Sweeney studies showed that the strength of a data point can greatly increase the
success of a linkage attack. Yet, the Netflix study shows that, given a sufficient
number of data points, linkage attacks can reach nearly 100 percent success rates
regardless of the strength of each data point.
The amount of data collected and speed by which it can be processed renders
de-identification as nothing more than a nuisance in the modern age.
3. Qualified Purchasers Are Better Linkers
Ever-growing data sets, the consolidation of data through bankruptcy, and
linkage attacks present a combined threat to privacy unforeseen by existing legal
treatments. This is made worse by the current “protection” measures requiring a
qualified purchaser. The inefficacy of de-identifying PII would have been made
evident when B&N purchased customer PII from Borders, but the court did not
utilize de-identification and required an opportunity for customers to opt out
instead.203 Even if Borders customer PII had been de-identified, the Netflix
experiment creates a reasonable expectation that each Borders customer could
be re-identified by B&N.204 Borders customer data that was de-identified could
contain information such as age, ZIP Code of place of purchase, residence, book
preferences, and date of purchase. B&N could cross-reference de-identified
records with its own customer records and link the de-identified PII records to
its existing customers. If any link failed, B&N could wait for further data points
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Nick Brown, B&N Get Court’s OK on $14 Million IP Sale, REUTERS (Sep. 26, 2011),
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as customers continued to buy books, or could wait for a Borders customer to
buy his or her first book from B&N.
Since Borders cannot serve as a clear example, RadioShack’s disparate
treatment of contract terms will help frame the issue further.205 General Wireless
purchased RadioShack and Apple customer information, but it was not allowed
to purchase AT&T and Verizon customer data.206 Since General Wireless and
Sprint would be re-opening RadioShack stores together and would both compete
with AT&T and Verizon in the mobile service market, the court was arguably
preventing the acquisition of an unfair competitive advantage.207 Apple, on the
other hand, provides hardware and not mobile services, so Apple was unlikely
to suffer unfair competition from the sale.208 This decision reinforces bankruptcy
courts’ discretionary power and provides an example of de-identified data sets
that were sold to someone with related data.
RadioShack customer data such as phone numbers, credit card information,
social security numbers, dates of birth and other PII were de-identified to protect
privacy, but this also adversely affected the value of the data set.209 The problem
is that the information still included the “where, when, and what,” and likely
also the “how,” of an item’s purchase. Thus, for each item purchased, there are
at least three other data points. For example, if someone buys an iPhone from
the new Sprint/General Wireless operation, then that person is almost certainly
going to be re-identified. The inherent problem of the qualified purchaser
requirement is that it greatly increases the likelihood of relatable data points,
which defeats the purpose of data being de-identified in the first place.210
Requiring information be de-identified and sold only to qualified purchasers
further devalues the already diminished bankruptcy sale price of consumer data.
If contract terms are being ignored to provide redress to creditors, then
bankruptcy courts should not work against the stated goal. In bankruptcy,
Borders sold its intellectual property for $13.9 million, which equates to about
205

Rich Letter, supra note 9.
See Rich Letter, supra note 9; Salvatore, supra note 13.
207
See Rich Letter, supra note 9; Salvatore, supra note 13.
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See, e.g., APPLE, https://www.apple.com/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2018) (showing the site does not offer
any mobile services to consumers).
209
See Suni Munshani, RadioShack Customers Won this Round, We Still Need Better Data Privacy
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210
Consider also that, in October 2016, the U.S. cellphone market share was 35 percent Samsung, 32
percent Apple, 14 percent LG, and 5 percent Motorola. See Lauren Guenveur, LG Flourishes While Moto
Struggles in the US, KANTAR WORLDPANEL (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.kantarworldpanel.com/global/
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$0.29 per customer; RadioShack sold its intellectual property package for $26.2
million, or about $0.39 per customer.211 Borders’ top twenty unsecured creditors
were collectively owed $241 million, which is over ten times what Borders
collected by selling customer data.212 RadioShack owed its top fifty creditors
$373.9 million, which is seven times more than what it collected from selling its
customer information.213 Considering that neither RadioShack’s nor Borders’
customer data was sold as a stand-alone asset, these are likely inflated sale
values.
These post-bankruptcy values are paltry when compared to the estimated
$100 million Kroger earns annually by sharing data from its customers.214
Although a solvent company’s data is worth more than one in bankruptcy, that
doesn’t explain why Kroger earns thirty times more per year on a similar asset
and does even less to explain how little data sells for in other circumstances.
Consumer data is rapidly generated, yet it is poorly secured. Both the rapid
generation of consumer data and its poor security further limits consumer data
values when they are treated as a commodity. Looking at general data values, as
sold by brokers, sheds light on how little value can be placed on personal
information. General information can be valued at as little as $0.0005 per
person215 while slightly more specialized information, such as PII of people
receiving some healthcare treatment, can sell for up to $0.26 per person.216
Knowing these values, we can infer that data values vary wildly depending on
the buyer, seller, market, and content.
211
Jenkins Simms, Does $14 Million Worth of Email Addresses Cross the Privacy Line?, CLIKZ (Oct. 6,
2011),
https://www.clickz.com/does-14-million-worth-of-email-addresses-cross-the-privacy-line/49526/;
Dawn McCarty, RadioShack Name Goes to Standard General for $26.2 Million, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 13,
2015),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-13/standard-general-bid-of-26-5-million-winsradioshack-brand.
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Judith Rosen, Borders Bankruptcy Wends On, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY (May 7, 2013),
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Former Execs, DALL. BUS. J., http://www.bizjournals.com/dallas/blog/techflash/2015/02/radioshackbankruptcy-heres-how-much-radioshack.html (last updated Feb. 6, 2015); see generally Cases, PRIME CLERK
(2018), https://cases.primeclerk.com/RadioShack/Home-ClaimInfo (table of creditor claims against
RadioShack).
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Vipal Monga, The Big Mystery: What’s Big Data Really Worth?, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2014),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/whats-all-that-data-worth-1413157156 (estimating that Kroger receives $100
million per year from data sales).
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Emily Steel et al., How Much is Your Personal Data Worth?, FIN. TIMES (Jun. 12, 2013),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/927ca86e-d29b-11e2-88ed-00144feab7de.html?ft_site=falcon#axzz4Zqn3F16W.
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4. Assets and Economics
Few concepts are as fundamental as supply and demand. Generally, as the
number of buyers decreases, so does the demand for a product. The product’s
price will fall if a decrease in demand is not matched by a decrease in supply.217
Consumer data follows the same principles, but the nature of its sale in
bankruptcy may be better viewed as an auction rather than an open market.
Here, the willingness to pay is correlated to a few distinct qualities of the
consumer data being sold. Some of these distinct qualities include number of
data points, relevance to the purchaser’s business, competition for the purchase,
and the availability of substitutes. De-identification reduces the number of data
points sold, which in turn decreases the value of a data set. Although the
qualified purchaser requirement may increase the likelihood that a data set will
be relevant to a potential buyer, it is self-evident that a buyer would be unlikely
to purchase irrelevant data.
Instead, the qualified purchaser requirement reduces the number of
competitors seeking the data set, which lowers demand and price. As established
earlier, the availability of substitutes can be seen both as ever-increasing and
finite, depending on the view. Since data is produced at such accelerated rates,
there is always more data in the market, but the opposite argument would focus
on the uniqueness of a data point. If each data point is unique, then a data set can
potentially maintain value even if new data sets are created, or against the
passage of time.
Consider Borders’ customer information. The data set comprises the
customer information of a consolidated book retail chain that was one of two
major retailers in the business of brick-and-mortar bookselling. This data set
shows the results of decisions made by Borders that are not shared by B&N,
which can illustrate a variety of lessons on how to predict market outcomes
based on certain inputs. If you combine it with the data already owned by B&N,
you can then ascertain the total market effects of the two companies’ divergent
strategies.
Combining this data set with those of Best Buy and Circuit City would
further allow a company to analyze the success and failure of companies in two
markets with two principal retail chains. The problem with the qualified
purchaser requirement is that, if a company is neither a bookseller nor an
electronics retailer, it would not be allowed to purchase either data set.
217
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The qualified purchaser requirement seeks to make data safe and valuable,
but instead reduces anonymity and stifles utility.218 Imposing a limitation on who
can purchase data does not increase value but, in fact, reduces value by limiting
market demand, while doing nothing to increase safety. This decrease in
consumer data value works against the principal aim of bankruptcy and
decreases the incentive to protect privacy, since tort remedies are based on the
harm suffered.
5. Reducing the Negative Right to Privacy
Torts are the common method for enforcing privacy. This places a great
burden on consumers, because they must prove harm if they are to receive
damages.219 In theory, companies are supposed to protect consumer privacy both
out of duty to customers and to avoid tort liability. If the law lowers consumer
data values, it lowers the incentive for companies to provide security, the brunt
of which is borne by the consumer. Since data values are so low, a company that
fails to secure consumer data is unlikely to face any meaningful repercussions
and thus has little incentive to operate otherwise.
In November 2014, Sony Pictures was hacked, which led to the breach of
the social security numbers of over 47,000 celebrities and employees.220 Sony
spent $35 million to repair its financial and IT systems—an inconsequential sum
compared to Sony’s reported $331 million income, before taxes, in fiscal
2015.221 The company’s former director of information security openly admitted
that investing $10 million to secure against $1 million in losses was not in the
company’s interests.222 This mentality was especially evident in the manner in
which the security systems were maintained. Sony’s information sector
218
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computers sat, logged in, in an unlocked room that was occasionally left
unguarded.223 When Guardians of Peace hacked Sony, the company was not just
unprepared, it also failed to respond to the privacy threats with any sense of
urgency.224 Sony eventually strengthened its security, but only after the hacks
resulted in the resignation of an executive and directly threatened Sony’s ability
to generate revenue. Movie stars, politicians, and many others were affected by
leaked e-mails revealing controversial statements, which painted Sony in a
negative light.225 Sony is not the only company whose data has been
compromised, nor is its breach cost to revenue ratio unique.
In 2013, hackers stole forty million Target customer credit card numbers and
70 million other customer records, such as e-mail addresses and phone
numbers.226 Target faced liability for a net total of $105 million after insurance
reimbursements and tax deductions, accounting for 0.1 percent of Target’s 2014
sales.227 When an estimated fifty million Home Depot customer credit card and
e-mail addresses were hacked, it cost Home Depot $28 million. This is less than
0.01 percent of its 2014 sales.228 Since tort liability is the primary method to
address privacy breaches, there is a need for change.
Sony’s data breach cost more per record stolen than the Target or Home
Depot breaches combined. The cause of this discrepancy can help determine the
problem. Sony expected to pay $1063.83 per person, but the information was
owned by wealthy individuals, those in possession of sensitive Sony
information, or both.229 Target paid $1.50 per person and Home Depot paid
$0.56 per person, which is dwarfed by Sony’s per-person costs. This difference
is likely a combination of whose information was stolen as well as the fact that
the Sony hack was politically motivated230 rather than a simple data theft. In
223
Peter Elkind, Inside the Hack of the Century, Part 1, FORTUNE (Jun. 25, 2015), http://fortune.com/sonyhack-part-1/ (“Their Info Sec was empty, and all their screens were logged in. Basically the janitor can walk
straight into their Info Sec department.”).
224
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225
Id. (Pascal’s email exchanges)
226
Maggie McGrath, Target Data Breach Spilled Info on as Many as 70 Million Customers, FORBES (Jan.
10, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2014/01/10/target-data-breach-spilled-info-on-asmany-as-70-million-customers/#cbe0d12e7954.
227
Hackett, supra note 220 (illustrating the inequity of burdens shared by consumers and companies in
the face of data breaches and the loss of millions of customers’ information).
228
Id. (“In the third quarter of fiscal 2014, [Home Depot] recorded $43 million of pretax expenses related
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and probable of recovery under its insurance coverage, for pretax net expenses of $28 million.”).
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Korea. See Elkind, supra note 223.
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2016, Yahoo’s data breach became the largest in U.S. history, with 1.5 billion
accounts exposed.231 Although Yahoo lost $350 million from its sales price to
Verizon, that loss translates to only $0.23 per customer record stolen.232
What makes the token cost to Home Depot and Target particularly egregious
is that the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA) places a disproportionate
burden on consumers to protect themselves when a company fails to secure
data.233 Under EFTA, a consumer who reports a card stolen within two days of
activity is free from liability, but if the theft is reported after two days and before
six months, the person can be liable for $50 to $500.234 Customers can easily be
liable for costs that are hundreds of times greater than when a company fails to
protect data it has collected. Securing data costs time, money, and resources that
companies are likely to spend elsewhere because they are liable for the smaller
share of the cost when data is breached.
Current market interventions by the state seek to optimize economic
efficiency, but arguably accomplish the opposite. Data sold in bankruptcy not
only exacerbates privacy threats, but the sale contravenes bankruptcy’s goal of
providing redress to creditors.235 Diminishing consumer data values in
bankruptcy further reduce company liabilities for failing to secure data. Since
consumers pay most of the cost of data breaches, it is important that the law
promote privacy protections with greater efficacy to better serve the people.
De-identifying PII is a protection long outpaced by technology and only
serves to lower consumer data values in bankruptcy. This treatment is neither
useful to bankruptcy’s goal of redress, nor is it an effective means of protecting
privacy.
Qualified purchaser requirements place artificial limits on the number of
buyers, which decreases competition and demand.236 Since bankruptcy has
limited influence on supply, decreases in demand will invariably decrease
price.237 Acting with the supply-demand curve in mind, bankruptcy courts can

231
Rodriguez, supra note 4 (“Yahoo announced that 500 million users’ accounts had been exposed in a
data breach. In December, the ailing internet company said another 1 billion accounts had been compromised in
a separate attack—the largest in US history.”).
232
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236
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better provide redress to creditors and also establish stronger incentives for
companies to protect consumer privacy.
6. FTC as the Gap Filler
Acting FTC Chairman Ohlhausen recently wrote, “We have long defined
sensitive information to include financial information, health information,
Social Security Numbers, information about children, and precise geolocation
information.”238 She further explains that the FTC now includes television
viewing activity within the definition of sensitive information.239 The FTC’s
justification is that the possession of television viewing activity can or is likely
to cause a “substantial injury” under 14 U.S.C. § 45(n), but “substantial injury”
in the context of consumer information requires clarification and
reconsideration.240
Consumers face a greater threat of substantial injury as big data collects
increasingly personal information, which reinforces the need for stronger data
security.241 Reports of dark web activity show what data is currently selling for
and indicate that social media accounts and other communication account
information sell for more than credit card information. The following chart lays
out the going rates for different data sets.
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Hackers seek personal information such as social media and e-mail accounts
because identity is the foundation of financial transactions. The FCRA enabled
the economy to use customer data and foresaw the need for protection even
though the law has been inadequate in providing it. FTC regulations have
worked to protect consumer privacy and have assisted bankruptcy courts in
doing the same. This Comment proposes that bankruptcy better serve its own
interests while assisting the FTC in its mission to protect consumers.
Bankruptcy courts are in the unique position to split the burden of protecting
consumer privacy among the government, public, and companies. As Congress,
the FTC, and the courts establish solutions, companies can be incentivized to
respect consumer privacy as a right to be protected instead of a minimal cost to
be ignored.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
If the law seeks to provide redress to creditors, then requiring a qualified
purchaser and de-identifying consumer information works against that purpose.
De-identification does not provide sufficient security, and qualified purchasers
are more likely to circumvent the already weak protections. A limited pool of
buyers decreases competition, which, in turn, decreases price. As the price of
consumer data decreases, so does a company’s liability if the data is breached.
If consumer data sells for a greater value in bankruptcy, then the consumer can
argue for a greater value when that data is breached, which strengthens
companies’ incentive to bolster security.
A. Bankruptcy Courts Should Use Their Discretion to Set Increased Minimum
Liability for a Company’s Failure to Secure Purchased Data
Asset distributions operate under constant state economic intervention from
the moment the goods are made available to the state-regulated market.248 These
interventions are made necessary by the very nature of bankruptcy itself, since
the discharge of debts often results in legally circumventing prior contractual
obligations.249 State interventions impose artificial limitations on market inputs,
which directly affect market outcomes.

248

See 11 U.S.C. § 726. (2012).
Phillipe Aghion, Oliver Hart, & John Moore, The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, in THE
TRANSITION IN E. EUR., VOL. 2 (Jan. 1994), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6727.
249
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Bankruptcy courts should use their discretion to create more equitable
alterations of contract terms. Currently, consumers are forced into privity of
contract with new parties, often without consumer consent. Instead, to ensure
that consumers are benefitting from the bargain or at least do not suffer from it,
courts should require the purchaser of consumer data to accept increased liability
for failing to secure consumer data. Establishing this liability can be done in two
ways.
First, the court can calculate current market values for consumer data, not as
it stands in bankruptcy, but as an asset in a living market. To establish the current
market value of consumer data, courts should aggregate consumer data as
expected values both in and out of bankruptcy. This will yield a value that is
more commensurate with the actual market and allow for more accurate
reflections of what values companies should place on security.
Expected values are predicted values of a variable, calculated as the sum of
all possible values each multiplied by the probability of its occurrence.250 Here,
the court would aggregate an expected value by using four variables: (1) the
value of the consumer data before bankruptcy, (2) the probability of surviving
bankruptcy, (3) the value of the consumer data in bankruptcy, and (4) the
probability of bankruptcy liquidation. Taking the product of the value of
multiplying the value of the data before bankruptcy by the probability of the
company surviving bankruptcy produces the probable value of the data outside
of bankruptcy. Multiplying the value of data in bankruptcy and the probability
of bankruptcy resulting in liquidation then produces the value of data in
bankruptcy.
The value of consumer data before bankruptcy can be found by pricing
similar consumer data available on the market. The court would use prior cases
or prices offered to price the value of consumer data in bankruptcy in the current
case. Probability of survival or liquidation could use prior bankruptcy cases with
similar circumstances or other uses of discretion. Second, courts should
calculate the average cost of consumer data breaches borne by the consumer and
the government. In other words, aggregate the direct and incidental financial
losses incurred from a data breach, such as the cost of paying for fraudulent
charges, increased interest rates, decreased credit scores, and cost to investigate
and combat fraud to find the value of the data. Once the aggregate harm is
250
One example of this concept is the Learned Hand Formula used as a calculus of negligence. Judge
Learned Hand proposed that negligence can be proven where the burden of preventing a harm is outweighed by
the probability of the harm multiplied by the magnitude of the harm. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,
159 F.2d 169 (2d. Cir. 1947).
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established, the burden should be distributed among the negligent parties based
on comparative fault.251
Combining these two calculations, a qualified purchaser can choose to
accept a base amount of financial liability based on these values. If accepted, the
company would then have to consider the cost of a guaranteed data breach
against a calculated cost of security. For example, if a company totally fails to
secure its data, then one can assume that a breach is guaranteed. Say that breach
would cause the company to face $1 million liability. This incentivizes the
company to spend no more than $1 million on protecting its data.
Now, take those same facts but add data security to the equation. The
company knows that spending money on security will decrease the likelihood of
a breach. Therefore, the company would be incentivized to conduct a costbenefit analysis to determine how much money to spend on security. Assume
that the company decides to spend $500,000 on security and estimates that this
will reduce the chance of breach to 25 percent. In the current example, the
company still incurs a risk of breach occurring but has now balanced that risk
against the potential reward. By spending $500,000 on security, the company
would have a 75 percent chance of incurring a $500,000 discount from the initial
$1 million liability, but also has a 25 percent chance of incurring a liability of
$1.5 million. These numbers would actually be smaller because it is intuitive

251
To illustrate this, imagine a company has a 30 percent probability of successfully executing a chapter
11 plan and it possesses data on one million customers that is worth an aggregate market value of fifteen million.
The value of the data would then be an estimated 4.5 million dollars, or $4.50 per customer. If that same company
then has a 70 percent probability of being forced to liquidate through chapter 7 bankruptcy and the data will
likely sell for half a million dollars, then the value of the data in bankruptcy would be $350,000 dollars or $0.35
per customer. If this were further aggregated by weighing each value, then the expected value of the data would
be the product of the value in bankruptcy multiplied by the likelihood of liquidation added to the likelihood of
surviving bankruptcy multiplied by the value of the data before bankruptcy. Here, that would result in a nonbankruptcy value of 1.35 million dollars and a bankruptcy value of $245,000 dollars resulting in an expected
value of $1.595 million dollars. To calculate this number, the court simply looks to prior incidents. If a similar
company suffered a breach and one hundred thousand consumers suffered an average loss of four hundred
dollars, the consumer burden would be forty million dollars. If the government spent two million dollars
combatting that breach and investigating the matter, then the government burden is two million dollars. That
would be an aggregate of forty-two million dollars of harm. If eighty percent of consumers were found liable for
half the loss due to improper security on their part, then that harm could be lowered to sixteen million for
consumer harms and two million for government harms totaling eighteen million in aggregate harm. To prevent
burdening companies with onerous penalties, that value would then be calculated using the Learned Hand
Formula to establish duty. Calculate the likelihood of a data breach, multiply it by the aggregate harm, and then
compare to the costs of securing the data. Instead of holding the company liable for all, the court can choose to
discount the cost of securing data. Thus, in the above example, if the harm is $240 per consumer and the company
spent $225 per consumer to prevent a breach, then the result would be $15 per consumer. The court could then
require the company purchasing the data to accept a minimum liability of $15 per consumer record.
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that if a company spends money on security, then a breach would result in less
than 100 percent of the data being stolen, which means the liability would be
lower.
In conclusion, the company’s risk profile would determine how it conducts
its cost-benefit analysis, which would influence how much money it chose to
spend on security. As a general rule, if the damages a company would incur
increases, so does the amount that is cost-effective to secure against those
damages.
B. Bankruptcy Courts Should Redefine What Constitutes Qualified
Purchasers and What They May Purchase
If the bankruptcy court redefines the qualified purchaser requirement, the
pool of potential buyers will increase. This, in turn, should increase what
companies pay for consumer data because there will be increased competition
among prospective buyers. The threat of a purchaser abusing the data it acquires
can be mitigated by setting liability minimums that elevate the company’s risk
calculations. The qualified purchaser requirement is supposed to limit the sale
of consumer data to only those who seek the data for good faith reasons. If a
company is not a qualified purchaser under the current framework, then it can
demonstrate good faith by accepting increased liability.
Again, the bankruptcy court can use its discretion to set a limited increase in
liability value for a “qualified purchaser,” and a greater increased liability value
for anyone who does not qualify for a discounted rate.252
C. Bankruptcy Courts Should Order Unsold Data Destroyed
If data is not sold in bankruptcy distributions under this system, then it
demonstrates the data’s lack of value or that no buyer is willing to accept the
burden of securing the data. In either circumstance, the destruction of data serves
the dual purposes of decreasing supply to increase the value of other data and of
preventing the harm that would occur if an irresponsible buyer were to acquire
the data.
If bankruptcy courts were to set increased minimum liability values for
failure to prevent a breach of consumer data sold in bankruptcy, companies
would have greater incentive to secure data and increase data values. These
increased values would strengthen incentives to protect consumer privacy by
252

Using the prior example, the value could be set between $15 and $240 per consumer record.
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increasing the amount that companies pay for consumer data—both before and
after bankruptcy filings. This circular relationship would see data security and
values rise and would serve to increase redress to creditors while simultaneously
increasing consumer privacy protections. In turn, it would raise awareness of
consumer privacy, since there would now be a financial interest in protecting
these rights.

CONCLUSION
Current legislative treatment aims to increase security and maximize redress.
This treatment limits who may purchase data and attempts to increase security
through anonymization. These efforts are meant to allow for private data assets
to increase redress to creditors, but by compromising both, consumers are left
without adequate privacy protections and the data sold is often undervalued. To
combat this inefficiency, bankruptcy judges should use their discretion to
increase the amount of redress to creditors while ensuring greater protections for
consumer privacy.
By implementing a minimum liability value for failing to protect these
assets, companies have an increased incentive to secure that data. The
subsequent increase in security investment will affect the data’s market value
before bankruptcy, which in turn will increase its value in bankruptcy. As the
liability for data breaches increases, so will investment and the end result will
increase the security of consumer privacy and the redress provided to creditors
when data is sold in bankruptcy.
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